This paper attempts to show how a particular concept and measure of complexity, as derived from automata theory, can be meaningfully interpreted in a program of 'limited rationality' regarding individual or social choices. The complexity measure appears to be a natural consequence of looking at a decision rule as a finite-state machine that computes preferences bounded by computational constraints. By factoring the social decision process into component processes it is demonstrated how searching for improvement depends on 'structural' and 'computational' limitations. sion of the 'economic m a n ' to the limitation of access of information and computational capacities being available to human decision-makers. The computational dimension is probably the most important aspect of characterizing 'limited rationality', in fact, this point has been brought up in a similar connection by H.Leibenstein [ 6 ] where he interprets 'rationality' in tenns of 'calculatedness' (computability) and tightness or looseness of calculatedness is supposed to cover the whole spectrum between rationality and limited rationality.
1.
Introduction The notion of 'global rationality' underlying the construction of 'economic man' that is generally accepted at least in normative economics has come Increasingly. under attack by those who care for more fruitful behavioral assumptions in economic reasoning. This notion is intrinsically related to various optimization programs that have been implemented in economics but that have been found only of limited use in realistic, complex situations. H.A. Simon [ 8 ] deserves credit having observed the limitation of global rationality and suggesting a modification of this program by introducing his concept of 'limited rationality.' To a great extent these ideas were carried forward in studying human thought processes where it was found that decisionmakers , for purposes of problem-solving , go through several stages of goal formation, a hierarchical representation of goals, super-and subgoals, where at every stage goal attainment rather than optimization is called for. Such programs are motivated by the complexity of problem-solving tasks that are treated successfully by decomposing problem-solving in a sequential way and by associating to every stage of the process the attainment of a subgoal. Goal-oriented behavior, therefore, is non-optimizing behavior and only improvement-related with respect to the attainment of the next goal in a sequence. (G.W.Ernst and A.Newel1 [ 2 1 ) . sion of the 'economic m a n ' to the limitation of access of information and computational capacities being available to human decision-makers. The computational dimension is probably the most important aspect of characterizing 'limited rationality', in fact, this point has been brought up in a similar connection by H.Leibenstein [ 6 ] where he interprets 'rationality' in tenns of 'calculatedness' (computability) and tightness or looseness of calculatedness is supposed to cover the whole spectrum between rationality and limited rationality.
The computational dimension of limited rationality as applied to the social choice process is analyzed here in a more rigorous fashion than has been done before. It turns out that complexity is an essential tool for analyzing constraints on the decision process. Moreover, any axiomatic system of 'limited rationality', yet to be defined, must contain complexity as a primitive notion.
The paper attempts to show how a social decision function can be constructed, by unconventional tools, such that it is compatible with individual decision functions. Complexity enters the construction as the basic limiting factor.
Choice Processes and Complexity On the level of individual or social
Simon E 1 1 1 relates a need for revichoice problems complexity relates to the ability of human beings to make effective choices in a consistent or rational way. In this regard complexity exhibits some kind of uncertainty that cannot be treated properly in terms of probabilities.
One clear indication when complexity enters individual decision-making is given by not being able to prove that a utility function representing preferences or choices does exist. If this proves to be a legitimate question on the level of individual decision-making, it is even more so on a social choice level.'' ~.~.~o b e r t s [9,p.1271 proposes t w o ways out of t h i s dilemma:
' ... one approach t o the decisionmaking i s t o describe a procedure whereby we can modify or redefine or make explic i t our preferences in the course of decision-making i n o r d e r t o become more * r a t i o n a l * (i.e., t h a t such a u t i l i t y function w i l l e x i s t ) . ' manding, is t o s e t t l e f o r a u t i l i t y assignment which best approfirnates t h e u t il i t y f u n c t i o n .
It is d o u b t f u l t h a t t h e f i r s t approach leads t o a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n . Since even i f it is p o s s i b l e t o t e a c h i n d i v i d u a l s how t o a c t more r a t i o n a l l y than they used t o behave, they w i l l never be 'perfect computers' and t h e r e i s a threshold of complexity beyond which they cannot effectively handle sit u a t i o n s , f o r i n s t a n c e , making choices among many a l t e r n a t i v e s . P u t i n a d i ff e r e n t way, you can t r y t o teach subjects how t o make optimal decisions in a simple course of actions, as J. M a rschak (71 suggests on the basis of psychological s t u d i e s on t h a t matter. But s t i l l teaching optimality does not cope w i t h t h e problem t h a t people simply make mistakes because of complexity or 'embarras de richesse' in selecting among many a l t e r n a t i v e s --i n the same way a s people understand simple a r i t h m e t i c a l r u l e s b u t cannot solve complicated arithmetical problems in the large because of time, resource and computational cons t r a i n t s . adopt reasonable behavior strategies ( i n t h e sense of being within their 'computational budget') which cope w i t h t h e intrinsic complexity of ( s o c i a l ) choices, e.g. those rules e x h i b i t i n g non-optimizing behavior.
Regarding t h e second approach, much of the c o n t r i b u t i o n by measurement theory has been i n the d i r e c t i o n of weakening preference requirements (for example, Luce's semiorder theory, avoiding indifference, but admitting thresholds).
The weaker assumptions aim a t reducing t h e computational burden of de- cision-makers, yet they fail to make exp l i c i t the complexity bounds i n forming decis ion rules.
Many choice processes in the r e a l world, In c o n t r a s t t o t h e o r e t i c a l cons t r u c t s used by choice theorists, repres e n t e s s e n t i a l l y ill-structured problems t o the e x t e n t t h a t s o l u t i o n s o f t h e s e p r o b l e m are n o t r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e and they involve an excessive amount of comp u t a t i o n a l power. In general, a problem is considered t o be well-structured i f it satisfies a number of c r i t e r i a , the most i q x m t a n t of which r e l a t e t o t h e existence of a t least one problem space A second approach, sanewhat l e s s de-
The a l t e r n a t i v e t h e n is that people t h a t p r o v i d e s f o r s o l v a b i l i t y w i t h the help of a practicable (reasonable) amount of computation or search. Apparently w ss t r u c t u r e d problems such as theorem-pror I n g and chess playing in a r t i f i c i a l i nt e l l i g e n c e t u r n out i n PIMY i n s t a n c e s t o be ill-structured, given the problem-solvi n g power of problenrsolving mUthobs.There seems t o be an I n t r i n s i c r e l a t i a n s h i p between well-or Ill-structuredness of a probl e m and the'threshold of complexity (in von Neumann s sense) below which a system shows a r e g u l a r , stable and p r e d i c t a b l e behavior b u t beyond which o f t e n q u i t e d i f f e r e n t , sometimes c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e modes of behavior can occur.
A problem can be well-structured in t h e small, but i l l -s t r u c t u r e d i n t h e l a r g e . According t o H. Simon (131 ' t h e d i f f i c u l t y stems from the Fnrmense gap between computabiZts p a c h g e as those of games l i k e chess.' This generall y applies to complicated choice processes.
Therefore, the problem of complexity i s similar t o the problem a chess player faces when searching for a ' s a t i s f a c t o r y ' s t r a t e g y i n chess. The s o c i a l c h o i c e problem resembles t h e choice of strateg i e s i n chess-playing t o the e x t e n t t h a t the decision-maker is involved in a choice problem of combinatorial dimension.
To search f o r a l l g a m ? -t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s goes f a r beyond the computat i o n a l a b i l i t y of t h e human being.
One conclusion, therefore, appears t o be obvious: we have t o d e p a r t from behavioral hypotheses involving optimizing behavior, as convenient as it might be in mathematical tenas, s i n c e it does not come t o g r i p s w i t h n a n -t r i v i a l c h o i c e p r o b I e m i n complex s i t u a t i o n s . W e do not have t o l e a v e t h e grounds of rationality, a rule-of-thumb method m y be r a t i o n a l i n a r e s t r i c t i v e s e n s e , t h u s we have t o view it in t e r m of ' l i m i t e d r a t i o n a l i t y . ' Rule-of-thumb methods aray be applied f o r various reasons: either because the individual faces expected costs of coniputat i o n t o be f a r beyond expected u t i l i t y of f u r t h e r searches I n choice-theoretic behavior or he (she) i s faced w i t h an immense mass o f a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e eff e c t t h a t he (she) i s psychologically o u t s t r i p p e d by the ensuing 'camplexity of computation.'
Chess p l a y e r s t e n d t o choose simpler decision rules, t h e y do not consider a l l p o s s i b l e s t r a t e g i e s and pick up the best, but generate and examine a rather small number, making a choice as soon as they discover one that they regard as s a t i s f a c t o r y . According t o H.Simon 1121, 'limits of r a t i o n a l i t y in chess involve (a) uncertalnty about the consequences that would follow from each a lt e r n a t i v e , (b) incomplete information about the set o f a l t e r n a t i v e s , and r i n c i l e and ractical canrputa-(c) complexity preventing the necessary computations from being carried out.' under a more general concept of complexit y i n c h o i c e -t h e o r e t i c s i t u a t i o n s . For example, uncertainty and lack of information may here assd i f f e r e n t aspects t o what is widely known i n s t a t i s t i c a l decision theory and the economics of uncertaint y , e . g . u n c e r t a i n t y r e s u l t i n g from comp u t a t i o n a l i n c a p a b i l i t y when faced w i t h a l a r g e number of choice a l t e r n a t i v e s . These are e s s e n t i a l l y n o n -p r o b a b i l i s t i c s i t u a t i o n s . T h u s , complexity is an imp o r t a n t tool f o r e v a l u a t i n g d e c i s i o n r u l e s , i n f a c t , it may prove instrument a l f o r an axiomatic analysis of 'bounded r a t i o n a l i t y ' which is s t i l l lacking.
3 . Some Formal P r e r e q u i s i t e s W e present here some formal definit i o n s toward developing a more general theory of complexity for social choice s i t u a t i o n s t h a t may prove useful t o understand the concepts t o be used througho u t the following section. In this part i c u l a r c o n t e x t , s u c h a general theory of complexity has been introduced earlier by C. F u t i a [ 3 ] , more generally see Gottinger [51.
( 1 ) If A is a non-empty set of symbols, then l e t A* represent t h e set of a l l s t r i n g s whose members are elements of A, i.e. A* = {a, ,.. . ,a :n 2 1 and a E A ) .
Then we d e f i n e a s e q u e n t i a l machine as a f u n c t i o n f : A*+B where A i s the basic input s e t , B is t h e output set and f (a, ,.. . ,an) = bn is t h e output a t time n i f a . is t h e i n p u t a t time j (l_<j_<n).
This'is
t h e e x t e r n a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f a seq u e n t i a l machine by specifying a function A l l t h r e e p r o p e r t i e s may be subsumed n j f : A* * B. Tfie lnte-rnai description involves a c i r c u i t ( A , B , Z , X , I ) , where A and B are defined as above, Z is the (nonempt y ) set of i n t e r n a l states, I:ZxA+B is the output function, x:ZxA+Z is the nextstate function. The s t e p from the ext e r n a l t o the i n t e r n a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f a system is r e f e r r e d t o as i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .
I t is a problem t o show t h a t g i v e n f we may f i n d a C and a Z S Z such that C ' realizes' f with f = system given by s t a r t i n g C = ( A I B , Z , A f 6 ) i n state Z E Z , then C, is defined induct i v e l y i n a straight-forward way:
For example, l e t C:t,* + B be t h e C z ( a l ) = 6(z1a1)
( 2 ) L e t f:A* + B a machine. Then f s I the semigroup of f , is given by the congruence 3 on A* where f o r t l r l e A*,tzfr i f and only i f f ( a t 6) = f ( a r 6 ) for a l l a,B E A* U { 1 ) . Then, i f [t] , denotes t h e equivalence class of t h e equivalence rel a t i o n 3 f containing t , we have fs = { [ t l f : t E A*} and [ t l f -[ r l f = [ t r l f (where t r denotes t h e product in A* and denotes the product in fS) . 11 1 is t h e empty s t r i n g . transformation semigroup is a pai-+s), ( 4 ) A r i g h t mapping semigroue or ri h t where X is a nonemtv set. and S is a subsemigroup of F ( X ) * the semigroup of a l l mappings of X knto X under t h e m u l t i p l ication (f-g) (x) = g ( f ( x ) 1. For each x E X , s ES, l e t x8 = (x) s. Then the following conditions are s a t i s f i e d :
( 2 ) s1,s2 o S and s1 # s2 imply xs # x s 2 f o r some x E X. ( 5 ) (Wreath Product) L e t (Xj,Sj) be r i g h t mapping semigroups for j=l,...,n.
L e t X = %x.. . xX . bet S be t h e semiqroup of P (X) c o n e i s t i d g of a l l function 9 : X * X s h sf y i n g t h e two following conditions:
(i) ( t r i a n g u l a r a c t i o n ) I f pk:X + Xk denotes t h e k t h projection map, t h e n f o r each k=l,...,n there e x i s t s fk:Xkx . . . x X1+Xk such t h a t f o r a l l ti E Xi, i = 1 ,. . . ,n.
(ii) (kth component a c t i o n lies i n Sk) We r e q u i r e f l E S 1 , and, for a l l k = 2,...,n and a l l a = = (tk-l ,.. . , t l ) E X~-~X . .
is t h e wreath product of (XnfSn) ,.. . , (X1 ,S1) , and ( X ,sn)w.. .w(X1 ,S1) is t h e abstract semigroup determined by (XIS) . ( 2 ) there e x i s t s a map e :Y'++x ( c c means onto) and an epimorphism +:T'++s such t h a t e (yt) = e ( y ) + ( t ) for a l l y E Y ' , t E T'. (7) (eohn-Rhodes Decomposition 181) L e t be a r i g h t mapping semigroup. Then t h e (group complexity # (X,S) = #,(SI is def i n e d t o be t h e smaflest non-negative ingaEFR(Xk) given by ga(yk) = n teger n such that
holds w i t h GI, ..., Gn being f i n i t e groups and Co,..Cn finite combinatorial semigroups (flip-flops) ,i.e.the minimal number of alternations of blocks of simple groups and blocks of combinatorial semigroups necessary t o obtain ( X , S ) . Hence by making f u l l use of decomposition res u l t s on sequential machines one could redefine complexity i n terms of the phase space decomposition.
Therefore, complexity f i n d s i t s group -theoretic roots i n the fact that the transformation semigroup can be Denote by In the n-dimensional Cartesian product of I , and define a p r o b a b i l i t y density P on In representing the voter's i n i t i a l belief about w h i c h tax rates the agencies are likely to quote. The order of quotations presented t o the voter is considered t o be irrelevant, thus, for simplicity, it is assumed that P is s j w e t r i c , i.e. i f p is a permutation of {1,2,. . . ,n) and i f tP = ( t p ( l ) , . . . , t p ( n ) ) , then P ( t ) -P ( t P ) .
The set-up of this problem enables to construct a decision rule w h i c h prescribes t o the voter, for each i, whether t o stop searching after receiving i quotations or whether t o continue searching on the basis of the 1 quotations he has received. A decision rule is assunred t o be a mapping from a set of observations into a s e t of actions. I n t h i s problem, for each 1, l e t the set of actions be A = {'aspect' ,'re ect'), and the s e t of observations be 0 Instead, here we are i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e basic ill-structuredness of t h e probl e m given by t h e complexity of t h e dec i s i o n r u l e . To this end, on t h e basis of t h e previous section, we proceed t o associate with every decision rule D a (computer) program f which computes D. T h i s permits us t o d g f i n e t h e complexit y of t h e program by the amount of 'looping' between subprograms (computational complexity) and t h e i n t r i n s i c comp l e x i t y of the subprograms ( s t r u c t u r a l complexity). Hence, a s e q u e n t i a l machine is used as a metaphor for determining complexity of s e q u e n t i a l d e c i s i o n r u l e s . T h i s can be f u r t h e r illustrated by elaborating on t h e problem above by using the s e q u e n t i a l machine framework. L e t A = set of observable t a x rates = The computational length and the s t r u ct u r a l complexity of subsystems that are needed t o compute f D r e f l e c t s a measure of complexity for f (equivalently for t h e d e c i s i o n r u l e DP. Obviously, optimal i a a r u l e t h a t is generally more complex and more expensive but which may very well be beyond the computational power and sophistication of t h e v o t e r . Hence the voter, facing an i l l -s t r u c t u r e d problem wants t o make it well-structured by seeking a d e c i s i o n r u l e which matches his computational ability and sophisticat ion.
Complexity of Decision Rule
We suppose t h a t the decision-maker i d e n t i f i e s a l t e r n a t i v e s i n h i s choice space and does express preferences between a t least two a l t e r n a t i v e s by simply computing, else he f i n d s a l t e r n a t i v e s 'incomparable' t h a t cannot be computed. Preference statements are t h e r e f o r e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o computing devices, indifference statements are kept out because of possible vagueness. The decision-maker represented as a s i m p l e f i n i t e s t a t e machine, can be decomposed a c c o r d i n g t o perf o d n g these tasks. 3) I n the f i r s t case t h e job t o be done, e.g. computing preferences, is achieved by a simple group machine (that is a decision machine a c t i n g as a simple group in t h e mathematical s e n s e ) , i n the second case t h e a c t i v i t y c o n s i s t s of a combinatorial machine, acting as a ' f l i p f l o p ' which does n o t compute anything. 4, Realizing a decision-rule therefore means a decomposition of the decision process according t o t h e decomposit i o n of machines i n t o component machines t h a t 'hooked' together ( v i a t h e wreath prod u c t ) r e a l i z e the o v e r a l l machine. O f course, t h e complexity of decision rules may vary; a 'sophisticated' decision-maker may a c t i v a t e more simple groups, less f l i pf l o p s , or groups that compute faster, more accurately and more r e l i a b l y . T h i s type of decision-maker w i l l c a r r y more s t r u c t u r a l complexity i n t h e sense given in the previous section.
A (social) d e c i s i o n r u l e is a sequent i a l d e c i s i o n r u l e and as such is considered t o be a f i n i t e state machine (associated t o a f i n i t e semigroup) , and according t o complexity theory i t . h a s a f i n i t e decomposition. In this regard t h e r e s u l t s for Krohn-Rhodes complexity theory apply. The idea involved here is t o factor a soc i a l choice process into parts (components) where the global process is modelled as a transformation sexnlgroup associated t o a s o c i a l d e c i s i o n r u l e , and t h e l o c a l parts are represented by transformation subsemigroups. The new t o o l s o r i g i n a t e from decomposition results in automata theory. a l t e r n a t i v e s X = {a,b,...,x,y,zI and let Di = 1 i f f i prefers x t o y,Di = 0 i f f i is 'undecided' about x and yIDi = -1 i f f i p r e f e r s y t o x. L e t D be a nonempty set of d e c i s i o n r u l e s Di, X a nonempty c o l l e c t i o n of subsets X, a social decision function (SDF) then is a function F:XxD+P(X) , P(X) being the power set. A SDF f o r i n d i v i d u a l i is given by F{X,yI,D 1 ,x,yeX.
S o c i a l d e c i s i o n f d c t i o n s are i n fact decision machines i n the sense t h a t they decide on propositions about accepting or r e j e c t i n g social states , computing them by discrimination, (preference, non-preference) .
By doing t h i s , they generate as outputs dec i s i o n r u l e s and induce next states representing changes in preference profiles or configurations. There is good reason t o argue t h a t we should leave out fndifference statements since they cannot clearly be distinguished from t h e phenomenon of 'und e c i d a b i l i t y ' . I n t r a n s i t i v e i n d i f f e r e n c e arises in s i t u a t i o n s where a chain of ind i f f e r e n c e s , each of which seem reasonable, Consider a choice set of f i n i t e l y many adds up t o a s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e d i f f e r e n c e t o y i e l d a d e f i n i t e p r e f e r e n c e between t h e f i r s t and the last items in t h e chain. W e would l i k e t o avoid i n t r a n s i t i v e i nd i f f e r e n c e , t h e r e f o r e we require the dec i s i o n machine only t o accept preference rather than indifference staterents.
I n o r d e r t o c o n s t r u c t s u c h a decision machine l e t us s t a t e the following choiceset when the DM 1s b f r o n t e d Problem: L e t Xn = Xlx.. . xX be the social w i t h a sequence of f i n i t e l y many social a l t e r n a t i v e s . L e t A g A 1 s . . .%. be those sets o f a l t e r n a t i v e s in w h i c h the DM can a c t u a l l y f i n d crmparisoas ( i n t h e sense t h a t he prefers a l t e r n a t i v e s i n these sets and f i n d s himself in a p o s i t i o n t o compute preferences). L e t A be a nonempty c o l l e c t i o n o f a l l Ao,A1, ..., An.
Then h e constructs selection functions p0,p1 ,... ,pnrpi:X'4A s u c h t h a t f o r a l l xIEXI, p (xi)cAi. In a way p i c o n s t i t u t e s a reduction mechanism by reducing a l l p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s w i t h w h i c h the DM is confronted t o those w h i c h are conputed as actual choices .5) It is s a l d t h a t the DM accepts the d e c i s i o n r u l e Dl (xo, . . . ,xi) i f p (xo, . . . ,xi) CAI, more e x p l i c i t l y , accept Do(xo) i f p(xo)~Ao, accept Dl (xO,xl) i f p (xo,xl)tA1, etc.
ing the complexity bound of the DM, beyond w h i c h he is unable t o compute h i s preferences. The upper bound somewhat restricts him i n selecting decis i o n r u l e s w h i c h are 'beyond h i s cow p l e x i t y . ' Therefore, let k (Dl be t h e largest i n t e g e r s a t i s f y i n g the bound such t h a t %
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Haw is the bound t o be determined?
In a d i f f e r e n t context, regarding the complexity of Wynaric) finite-state systems, I d i s t i n g u i s h between design and c o n t r o l caoaplsxity. design complexity I understand that COIIp l e x i t y (number) a s s o c i a t e d t o €he transformation semigroup i n which f u l l .use .af t h e syatem p o t e n t i a l is made. Under conc i f i c complexity (number) that r e s u l t s from computations w h i c h keep t h e e n t i r e system or a t l e a s t p a r t of it under c a r plete control. A l i t a t i v e l stable d e c i s i o n r u l e wou -for which design and control coaaplexity coincide. However, i n nust p r a c t i c a l cases design complexity w i l l exceed control coraplexity. S i n c e one cannot assume t h a t t h e cont r o l complexity of an awerage (unsophist i c a t e d ) DM can be increased by teaching him how t o behave i n a r a t i o n a l =- of a l l possible s t r a t e g i e s t o a c h i e v e a chess-mate corresponds t o the design complexity of a chess-playing program. The number of a l l a c t u a l strategies chosen by a p a r t i c u l a r chess player to achieve success corresponds t o h i s control complexity. Given t w o chess players b o t h i n i t i a l l y endowed w i t h the sIknwladge of how t o play chess, then i f 1Lm a s u f f l c i e n t l y l o n g sequence of repetitive plays one does better than the o t h e r , he exhibits a better understanding of the game, e.g. a higher control complexity. t u r a l l y associated t o 'prourams of o p t imization' and 'programs of satisficing o r bounded r a t i o n a l i t y , r e s p e c t i v e l y . That is t o s a y , d e s i g n c o m p l e x i t y p e r t a i n s t o t h a t d e c i s i o n r u l e (which is best i n some appropriate sense), i n g e n e r a l an optimiz a t i o n p r i n c i p l e is involved, which, havever, cannot be realized given the limited computational resources of t h e DM (cont r o l complexity) .
t i v e l y be determined by experiments appears t o be a problem in experimental psychology. H o w e v e r , it is p o s s i b l e , a t least i n p r i n c i p l e , t o g i v e a set of crit e r i a under which it can be determined whether a DM chooses decision rules viol a t i n g h i s bound of complexity.7) Whenever individuals violate in experiments a set of consistency postulates (such as t r a n s i t i v i t y ) , namely those which they have accepted a t the very beginning, they w i l l r e a l i z e t h a t t h e y have committed comp u t a t i o n a l e r r o r s . Thus commitment of error or violating consistency postulates seem t o be s u i t a b l e criteria f o r determining complexity bouuda of computation. In experimental situations, subjects then have t o be confronted w i t h various decis i o n r u l e s of a d i f f e r e n t complicated character and the class of decisioa r u l e s i n which no e r r o r s o r a-st no errors occur c o n s t i t u t e those which s a t i s f y t h e c o n t r o l complexity of the D H .
Those d e c i s i o n rules are called qualit a t i v e l y stable. Only q u a l i t a t i v e l y stable decision rules guarantee that social, economic and political processes can be controlled i n any e f f e c t i v e way by soda1 choice, otherwise the amount of error, misr e p r e s e n t a t i o a of preferences, etc. could e a s i l y l e a d t o a d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n o f &de social system, and some degree of rational i t y can no longer be & n t d n & .
5.
A Constructiar of Compatible L e t P1 ,PZ,. . . be sets of computable Example. In a game of chess t h e number
In a certain way both concepts are na-
To which e x t e n t t h i s bound can effec- Again t h e complexity of t h e SDR D is bounded by t h e minimum complexity of the i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n r u l e s Dj ( f i n i t e state machines) w h i c h by i n t e r a c t i n g r e a l i z e a compatible social decision rule.' putable SDR when a l l members of the societ y set up their own individual decision rules can be described a s a s u e n t i a l e among t h e members. If t h e + game a s a von Neumann value we agree t o s a y t h a t a compatible SDR has been realized. For simplicity, l e t us assume t h a t there are only t w o members of t h e society which a f t e r h a v i n g computed their individual decision functions want t o f i n d a colapatible SDR (which satisfies both).
Assume t h a t t h e game s t a r t s i n C W e could def h e X = {*I UAoUA1 U.. . UAn,l 1'
A DM w i l l stop searching i f f u r t h e r
The procedure haw t o generate a comzO w i t h strategy p c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e s e l e c t i o n r u l e of t h e first member of society, then the c i r c u i t C = (A Suppose our SDR can be put in binary form, whenever the 'compute preferences' key i s followed we assign 1, otherwise 0. a s meaning that no consistent preference statement can be made s i n c e the number of choices involved i s too l a r g e and therefore we have t o eliminate redundant choice a l t e r n a t i v e s . Then under these circumstances , we could consider for a t least two players t h e construction of a compatible SDR t o be e q u i v a l e n t t o a game tree w i t h Example. In this game each player plays z e r o o r one successively --corresponding t o t h e construction of the decision rule. L e t us assume the c i r c u i t C Is a player who responds t o the action of t h e first player, and t h e c i r c u i t C ' . W denotes a win for t h e player, L denotes a l o s s f o r t h e player. The payoff i s +1 f o r W, and -1 f o r L. Clearly, the von Neumann value f o r t h i s game is +1 for t h e player who goes second. Assuming C goes second the strategies achieving the von Neumann value +1 can be listed as follows (and read o u t of t h e game tree) :
The l a t t e r case w i l l be i n t e r p r e t e d 
L e t C = (A,B,Z,X,6) be defined as follows: +,a,b,c,d,e,f,. ..r,s,tl. Then C , : A*+B induces a s e q u e n t i a l socia1 d e c i s i o n r u l e t o w h i c h there i s ass o c i a t e d a complexity, the complexity of the tansformation semigroup ( X , S ) . The problem is t o f i n d a minimal complexity of the transformation semigroup t h a t permits a construction of a social decision rule compatible w i t h the choice behavior of individual d e r s of the society. In view of (a)-(d) we succeed in doing t h i s by f i n d i n g the s t r i n g of minimal length, 1.e. t h e d e c i s i o n r u l e w i t h the minimal complexity.
The upper bound f o r the complexity follows from the following result: Proposition (J. Rhodes): L e t S be a semigroup of mappings on the f i n i t e set X (sequential choice space). L e t r be the maximum range (or fixed points) of any idempotent e = e* c S. Then I G ( S ) ( r-1. Proof. L e t I be t h e ideal generated by the idempotents of Sunmary and Extension W e have noticed haw choice processes could be f a c t o r e d i n t o compmemt subprocesses and how these are associated to properties of transformation semigroups. A social choice process could be understood as a s e q u e n t i a l game, as an i n t e r a c t i o n between i n d i v i d u a l choice processes in such a way that t h e interaction generates a SDR that is compatible w i t h a l l i n d i v i d u a l choice processes. To achieve this, ye use new tools of 'limited r a t i o n a l i t y ' , d e r i v e d from automata theory, e m b o d i e d in the system of social decision-making. Complexity as a c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n the choice of decision rules is r e l a t e d t o l i m i t a t i o n s o f human decision-making in terms of their capacity t o recall, memorize and compute only rel a t i v e l y few items among w h i c h c o n s i s t e n t choices can be made. I n c o n t r a s t t o conv e n t i a l social choice theory we cmly consider p r e f e r e n c e p r o f i l e s that a r e i n a certain sense 'computable', thus restrictt i n g t h e social choice process t o reasonable behavior rules. I t is not clear so f a r t o w h i c h e x t e n t the ideas expressed herein w i l l haw an i s p a c t on t r a d i t i o n a l social &oicc thcory, namely r e l a t i n g t o Arraw-type i m p o s s i b i l i t y or p o s s i b i l i t y theorems. In actual human decision-making, a l t e r n a t i v e s are o f t e n examined sequentially,consequently we consider this approach t o be b a s i c a l l y of sequemtial type, whereas t r a d i t i o n a l theory is static, e.g. a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s are evaluated before a choice i s made. Furthermore, in view of Arrow's assumptions an constructing a social w e lfare function (SWF) it appears that the assumption of 'unrestricted dorain' of the choice set w i l l no longer hold because of imposing strict ccmputational requirements. using complexity of decision rules as a p r i m i t i v e n o t i a n f o r a n a x i m t i z a t i o n o f economic behavior t h a t i n t r o d u c e s explicitly behavioral assumptians related t o l i m i t e d c u a p u t a b i l i t y . The m i s not only l i m i t e d i n h i s choice behavior by computational requirements, equally important, he is also restricted by a c t i n g as a mmber of a group or social class where i n o r d e r t o achieve s o m consensus ( f o r example, a ~O.IPO(I group decision function) he has t o adjust h i s behavior t o p a s t choices of other group members. This is illustrated by looking a t the adjustment mechanism as a s e q a e n t i a l g a m . The determinants of the ganre (environmental conditions, previous choice configurations) a r e themselves determined as 0ut-s of complicated cognitive processes, bounded by complexity. Caaplexity of this kind v i r t u a l l y c o v e r s t w o aspects: one is s t r u c t u r a l , the o t h e r Structural camplexity F = F = * ere re ates t o the ' s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ' o f t h e m, how he can reason when confronted w i t h d i f f i c u l t tasks, depending on h i s problem-solving c a p a b i l i t y (as discussed i n t h e example of the mfssionaries and the cannibals, see Ernst and N e w e l 1 121 1.
experience, t o t h e a b i l i t y t o letarn doing t h i n g s , organizing colputations. Both fact o r s are l i k e l y t o be h i # l y correlated, b u t t o a c e r t a i n d e g r e e t h e r e w i l l be trademffs between both, thus they are comp r i s e d i n one. camplexity measure. For a particular decision-raking design both f a c t o r s add up t o y i e l d i n g t h e c o n t r o l comp l e x i t y w h i c h together with the given design complexity provides the fundamental e v o l u t i o n c a p l e x i t y r e l a t i o n . This again has a clear i n t e r p r e t a t i a n i n d e f i n i n g g u a l i t a t i v e l y stable d e c i s i o n r u l e s .
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